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A B S T R A C T
Kenya’s March  elections ushered in a popular system of devolved govern-
ment that represented the country’s biggest political transformation since inde-
pendence. Yet within months there were public calls for a referendum to
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signiﬁcantly revise the new arrangements. This article analyses the campaign that
was led by the newly elected governors in order to understand the ongoing dis-
putes over the introduction of decentralisation in Kenya, and what they tell us
about the potential for devolution to check the power of central government
and to diffuse political and ethnic tensions. Drawing on Putnam’s theory of
two-level games, we suggest that Kenya’s new governors have proved willing
and capable of acting in concert to protect their own positions because the pres-
sure that governors are placed under at the local level to defend county interests
has made it politically dangerous for them to be co-opted by the centre. As a
result, the Kenyan experience cannot be read as a case of ‘recentralisation’ by
the national government, or as one of the capture of sub-national units by
‘local elites’ or ‘notables’. Rather, decentralisation in Kenya has generated a pol-
itical system with a more robust set of checks and balances, but at the expense of
fostering a new set of local controversies that have the potential to exacerbate cor-
ruption and fuel local ethnic tensions in some parts of the country.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Kenya’s March  elections brought into being a system of devolved gov-
ernment that represented the country’s biggest political transformation
since independence. This reform was undeniably popular: in a 
referendum, two-thirds of voters approved a new constitution that included
devolution alongside a new Supreme Court and Bill of Rights. The decen-
tralisation measures were extensive, providing for  county governments
complete with elected governors and assemblies. In the wake of the 
elections, early opinion polls found that % of Kenyans approved of the
idea of devolution. Yet just a few months later, there were public calls for a
referendum to signiﬁcantly revise the new arrangements, and by July ,
two separate campaigns to force a public vote on amendments were under
way. The ﬁrst effort was spearheaded by the recently elected county gov-
ernors, the second by the political opposition. Both were predicated on
a belief that the  constitution and associated legislation were not sufﬁ-
cient to prevent the recentralisation of power by the national government.
At the same time, multiple disputes emerged within and between the dif-
ferent levels of the new political system.
Focusing on the ﬁrst of these referendum campaigns – that were led
by the county governors – this article seeks to understand the ongoing
disputes over the introduction of decentralisation in Kenya, and what
they tell us about the potential for devolution to check the power of
central government and to diffuse political and ethnic tensions in
Africa more widely. We also consider the way in which governors’
choice of strategies has been shaped by competition with other
elected members at the county level, and the implications that these
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local struggles have for ethnic relations. In both cases, the focus of these
disputes has beenmoney, in the form of salaries and development funds.
However, this should not be taken to imply that the new kinds of contest-
ation that devolution has inspired can be reduced to a simple scramble
for personal enrichment. Rather, it also reﬂects the awareness of Kenyan
political actors that patronage and development funds are central to
sustain a political career, and a system of government (Barkan ;
Barkan and Okumu ).
Kenya is a useful test case for the impact of decentralisation in diverse
and conﬂict-prone states for three reasons. First, it has suffered recent
experiences of extensive electoral violence in ,  and .
Second, the political system has historically been over-centralised and
dominated by a powerful president. Third, there has been genuine
reform: decentralisation was neither killed at birth, as was the case in
the nearby Democratic Republic of Congo, nor was it limited to a set
of superﬁcial measures with little signiﬁcance. In addition to the cre-
ation of new avenues of local representation in the form of governors
and members of county assemblies (MCAs), counties have also been
given a voice at the national level through the election of one
women’s representative to the National Assembly and one senator to re-
present each county in a newly created second legislative chamber.
When the new constitution was inaugurated in August , most
Kenyan commentators, opposition parties and donors focused on the
potential beneﬁts of devolution. In line with the most optimistic litera-
ture on decentralisation, they extolled both its intrinsic and instrumen-
tal virtues. It was hoped that devolution would bring government closer
to the people, and provide democratic and development gains, by giving
previously marginalised communities an increased stake in the political
system and by enabling local solutions to be found for local problems.
Most of all, devolution was seen as a means to address Kenya’s chronic
ethnic conﬂicts: ‘the new Constitution establishes national values and
principles of governance that seek to diffuse, if not eliminate altogether,
the ethnic tensions fuelled by perceptions of marginalisation and exclu-
sion’ (Akech : ).
But Kenyan devolution was not without its sceptics. County-level polit-
ical leaders immediately spoke out about their fear that the government
would seek to stymie devolution, retain as much power as possible in its
own hands, and manipulate county level politicians and bureaucrats to
ensure compliance with central priorities. Knowingly or not, these more
cautious voices were echoing academic studies that have identiﬁed ‘recen-
tralisation’ as a key obstacle to attempts at decentralisation (Rondinelli
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et al. ). Important questions were also raised about the cost of the
new system of government, which effectively created  new sets of
elected representatives and bureaucracies, and the need to avoid the
costly duplication of goods and services (World Bank ).
Academics also warned of two additional threats; namely the devolu-
tion of patronage-based politics and corruption; and the potential
for devolution to create new winners and losers at the local level,
which could exacerbate existing social cleavages and, in the worst-
case scenario, create new fault lines of conﬂict (Boone ;
Cheeseman et al. ).
It is too early to assess the full impact of devolution in Kenya. The new
institutional arrangements are still in their infancy: it will take years
before they have bedded in, and it would be unfair and hasty to either
laud them for their early progress or condemn them for failing to
work smoothly thus far. Moreover, this paper does not focus on
common criticisms of devolution in Kenya; namely, that it has led to
the localisation of corruption (Cornell & D’Arcy Forthcoming), an
inefﬁcient duplication of resources, and the exacerbation of inter-com-
munal conﬂict (Burbidge b). Instead, this article focuses on the
continued political debate and competition over the terms of decentral-
isation, and argues that the Kenyan experience does not ﬁt into the
dominant narrative of recent literature, which tends to emphasise the
vulnerability of decentralisation reforms to elite manipulation (see
Boone ). More speciﬁcally, we show that the Kenyan experience
cannot be read as a case of ‘recentralisation’ by national government,
nor as one of the capture of sub-national units by ‘local elites’ or ‘nota-
bles’ (Wunsch ). Rather, we argue that Kenya has established a rela-
tively robust form of decentralisation, in which elected county governors
have emerged as the agents and focus of new political struggles, capable of
acting in concert to protect their own positions.
In making this argument, we draw on ﬁeld observation, more than 
interviews conducted by the three authors spread over two years, three
nationally representative surveys, donor reports and six case studies of
county level politics in Bungoma, Embu, Kericho, Kiambu, Kisumu
and Nairobi. These counties were selected to ensure variation in the
degree of political competition (one-party dominant to highly competi-
tive), ethnic composition and regional coverage. Based on this evidence,
we suggest that Kenya’s new governors have emerged as inﬂuential and
in many cases independent political players for two main reasons. First,
the process of constitutional reform – which was precipitated by the
 post-election violence and the need for a power-sharing
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government to relegitimate the political system – conferred on governors
more political and economic authority than has typically been the case in
the developing world (Ndegwa ). Indeed, although it is always re-
ferred to as a form of ‘decentralisation’, the constitutional protections
afforded to governors and senators, combined with the fact that at least
% of government revenue must ﬂow to the county level, mean that
in practice the Kenyan system is closer to Nigerian federalism than the
sort of limited decentralisation practiced in Malawi and Uganda
(Crawford and Hartmann ).
Second, the strategies selected by governors have been shaped by the
fact that they are required to operate in two very different political
arenas at the same time. In order to demonstrate this, we draw on
Robert Putnam’s theory of two-level games (), which he developed
to understand international negotiations in which national governments
had to consider two audiences: the domestic (trade unions, NGOs, op-
position political parties, voters) and the international (other countries
and international bodies). He suggested that in this context, national
governments faced two very different ‘win sets’ – one set of outcomes
that would be acceptable domestically, and one that would be acceptable
internationally. Only outcomes that were acceptable both domestically
and internationally were likely to represent a stable equilibrium. On
this basis, Putnam argued that we can only fully understand the way in
which countries negotiate within this much narrower set of options by
using theories that ‘account simultaneously for the interaction of domes-
tic and international factors’ (Putnam : ).
We draw on Putnam’s intuition to conceptualise the strategies adopted
by county governors, who must also operate in two different political
arenas – the county level and the national level – at the same time. In
the ﬁrst, governors must try and retain the support of voters and key
opinion makers in the face of constant challenges from local competi-
tors, such as MPs and senators who intend to run for the governorship
in future. In the second, governors must decide whether to support or
oppose the national government’s policies, especially with regard to de-
centralisation. Following Putnam, we suggest that recognising the exist-
ence of these two games is crucial because the particularities of each
game shape the options available to governors in the other. As we will
show, the pressure that governors are placed under at the local level
to defend county interests has made it politically dangerous for them
to be co-opted by the centre, and so has narrowed their options when
negotiating with the national government.
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However, governors do not all face the same pressures. Rather, the
impact of this two-level game is refracted through the country’s party
system. Kenya’s governors are drawn roughly equally from parties
within the Jubilee Alliance government and the Coalition for Reform
and Democracy (CORD) opposition. Being seen to be too close to the
national government is far more dangerous for opposition governors
given the dispositions of their electorates, especially given the political
polarisation and inter-ethnic tensions that have characterised Kenyan
politics in recent years (Cheeseman et al. ). Of course, opposition
leaders also have other reasons to support devolution, because it
enables them to gain access to resources that would otherwise be
closed to them (Cornell & D’Arcy Forthcoming). By contrast, Jubilee
Alliance-aligned governors are likely to be placed under less pressure
to resist central control, and face additional incentives to comply with
government demands – such as the promise of safe seats and plentiful
ﬁnance in future elections. Unsurprisingly, therefore, support for devo-
lution at both the elite and popular level remains highest within oppos-
ition strongholds. But as we shall see, despite this qualiﬁcation, pressure
from below has led even those governors who are ardent supporters of
the ruling Jubilee Alliance to argue that the funds devolved to the coun-
ties should be increased at the expense of the central government,
forcing national leaders to go to great lengths to tame their co-partisans.
Thus, party politics and ethnic alliances may shape the impact of the two-
level game, but they do not undermine it.
Taken together, the existence of this two-level game and the relative
strength of county level governments mean that governors – or at least
a signiﬁcant proportion of them – have both the motivation and the cap-
acity to resist capture by central government. One important implication
of this argument is that governors’ willingness to challenge the centre
has been motivated as much by self-interest and the need to overcome
county-level conﬂicts as it has been about any broader commitment to
localism. It is therefore both more reliable, and more sustainable.
Another is that decentralisation has generated a polity with a far more
robust set of checks and balances, but at the expense of fostering eco-
nomic inefﬁciency, corruption and a new set of local controversies
that have fuelled ethnic tensions in some parts of the country. The
product is a politically signiﬁcant and popular new tier of government
whose overall contribution to democracy, development and national co-
hesion remains contested and uncertain.
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T H E O R I S I N G D E C E N T R A L I S A T I O N
The academic debate on decentralisation has long pitted enthusiasts
against sceptics. Enthusiasts have focused on the theoretical beneﬁts
of decentralisation, both intrinsic and instrumental; their intellectual
lineage stretching back to de Tocqueville’s argument that it was the
ability of Americans in the early s to participate in local government
that enabled them to experience political freedom and to stave off the
threat of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Tocqueville  []).
More modern iterations of this view have emphasised the beneﬁts to
democratic decision-making of having a population that feels that they
have a stake in the political system. Others have argued that decentral-
isation offers an escape valve for regional or religious tensions
(Suberu ); or have stressed the consequent beneﬁts in terms of eco-
nomic ﬂexibility and service delivery (Bodea & LeBas ).
Decentralisation has also been posited as one of the most effective
ways to protect democratic gains in Africa and beyond.
Partly inspired by this literature, decentralisation has long been in
vogue within the development community. In the s, such support
largely stemmed from a desire to sidestep the centralised state and
improve service delivery (World Bank ). In the late s, emphasis
shifted to ‘good governance’ and the hope that decentralisation would
create new avenues through which notoriously corrupt central states
might be circumvented and made more democratic (USAID ).
By the s, decentralisation had emerged as something of a cure-all
policy prescription.
Sceptics, on the other hand, have tended to focus on the practical
barriers to effective decentralisation in particular contexts. One line
of critique calls into question the impact of decentralisation on inter-
communal relations and levels of national cohesion. Thus, in contrast
to the hope that decentralisation will decrease spatial inequalities, re-
search has shown that it often ‘accentuates horizontal inequalities
between richer and poorer areas as a consequence of differential
levels of administrative capacity and ability to raise local resources’
(Robinson : ). Given the kinds of communal tensions that exist
in polarised winner-takes-all states such as Kenya (Lynch ), such
an entrenchment of regional inequalities would likely facilitate political
mobilisation along ethnic lines and thus undermine efforts to foster na-
tional unity and cohesion. This combination can be toxic. As Brancati
has shown (), decentralisation often fosters ethnic conﬂict by en-
couraging the growth of regional parties that reinforce ethnic identities,
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produce legislation that favours certain groups over others, and fuel
ethnic political mobilisation up to and including secession.
A second problem with decentralisation is that its implementation is
often manipulated by central political elites to maintain their own
power and inﬂuence (for a Kenyan example, see Barkan & Chege
). A ‘stocktaking study’ conducted in  by Stephen Ndegwa
found that African states are some of the most centralised in the world
and that, even when decentralisation is introduced, central governments
often ﬁnd ways of preventing real power and authority being devolved out
of their grasp. As a result, the creation of sub-national governments may
be a route not to the decentralisation of power, but rather its deconcentra-
tion (Rondinelli et al. ). Given this, it should come as no surprise that
decentralisation often serves not to reform government, but to localise na-
tional-level problems. In this vein, Diane Conyers has posited that ‘admin-
istrative performance at the local level is, to a large extent, a mirror of that
in the country as a whole’ (: ). This point is echoed by Gordon
Crawford and Christoff Hartmann (), whose case studies of
Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania demonstrate how devolution of power is
far less likely to proceed smoothly where the capacity of central govern-
ment is weak, political trust is low, and democracy has yet to be consoli-
dated. In this sense, decentralisation is akin to power sharing: it is least
likely to work where it is needed most (Cheeseman ).
One of the most inﬂuential explanations of how such top-down ma-
nipulation occurs has been provided by Catherine Boone, who docu-
ments how governments can use decentralisation as a strategy to
create the appearance of devolving power while in reality defending
and entrenching their position. According to Boone, this political
sleight of hand is achieved because central elites typically enjoy the cap-
acity to ‘co-opt, demobilise, usurp, bypass or modify’ local notables
(: ). Thus, the periphery can be made to do the work of the
centre. Boone’s work is an important contribution to the debate,
because it emphasises the way in which incumbent governments can
instrumentalise processes of decentralisation, and reveals how the type
of relationship that emerged between the centre and the periphery
can shape the nature of the state.
Taking off from Boone’s analysis, we argue that Kenya represents a
deviant case in the African context, in which the ability of the central
government to recentralise power is comparatively low because the con-
stitution has created both a strong set of county governors and a
dynamic set of rival local actors. As a result, governors face considerable
incentives to resist central co-option. On the one hand, the intention of
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many senators and MPs to run for governor in the future has encour-
aged governors to campaign for new powers and sources of revenue
with which to secure their re-election. On the other, the likelihood
that any evidence of ‘selling out’ to the national government will be
used against them by their county level rivals, has deterred some govern-
ors from appearing to be too close to the national government – espe-
cially in opposition strongholds. The combination of these two
developments has given rise to a complex new political landscape in
which there is heated competition at and between all levels of govern-
ment. Under these conditions, there are signiﬁcant barriers to the
recentralisation of power by central elites.
We begin our discussion of decentralisation in Kenya by explaining
why local level actors in Kenya enjoy relatively strong political and eco-
nomic powers, despite the country’s recent experience of ethnic
tension and political instability (Cheeseman et al. ) before
moving on to contests between the governors and other local-level
actors, and governors and the centre.
D E C E N T R A L I S A T I O N I N K E N Y A
To some extent, Kenya ﬁts the pattern of decentralisation in Africa, in
which larger and more democratic states are more likely to devolve
power. Like Nigeria and South Africa, Kenya is one of the continent’s
bigger states by landmass, and has a large and varied society.
Decentralisation is naturally more likely in such contexts, where the
central government sits at a greater distance from its people (Zanker
et al. ). Like Ghana and Senegal, Kenya is also one of Africa’s
more open and competitive political systems (although how democratic
remains a subject of controversy). The Kenyan political landscape is
therefore relatively susceptible to pressure from below, at least when
compared with some of the continent’s more closed and repressive
states. This is reﬂected in the fact that while the former Kenyan political
system was criticised for featuring an ‘imperial presidency’ (Mutua
: ), the country’s ethno-regional politics have always involved
some devolution of resources and inﬂuence to a local level.
In the independence negotiations of the early s, leaders of
smaller and more economically marginal ethnic communities (who
feared the dominance of a Kikuyu–Luo ethnic elite) successfully
pushed for a majimbo or regionalist constitution, which promised to
devolve signiﬁcant powers to eight regional assemblies (Anderson
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). However, majimboism was immediately dismantled by the victori-
ous Kenya African National Union (KANU), who had only agreed to it as
a means to hasten independence (Lynch : ). Then in ,
President Daniel arap Moi granted district administrators new powers
to initiate and administer development projects through DFRD. But
the early promise of this reform was misleading, and in practice the
new political structures were less an attempt to meaningfully decentral-
ise power and more a gambit by Moi to legitimise and strengthen his
power through a process of deconcentration (cf. Boone ; see
Lynch : ).
With the return to multi-party politics in the early s, the idea of
majimboismwas revived by the new KANU leadership as ameans tomobilise
ethno-nationalist sentiments among self-conceived ‘locals’ against more
recent ‘migrants’ in the cosmopolitan areas of the Rift Valley and at the
Coast (Lynch ).However, despite the rhetorical resonance ofmajimbo-
ism, divisive ethnic politics –which culminated in pre-electoral ethnic
clashes in  and  – did not translate into any actual decentralisa-
tion of power. Instead, Kenyans had to wait until the introduction of the
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in  by the new National
Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) government for the transfer of greater funds
to the sub-national level. Under the CDF, ·% of national revenue is allo-
cated to MPs for the purpose of developing their constituencies. However,
it is worth noting that in many ways the CDF was not new, but rather
codiﬁed a set of existing practices known as harambee (self-help), in which
political leaders were expected to help organise and fund local develop-
ment initiatives. Under President Jomo Kenyatta (–), harambee
formed a central part of the government’s development strategy, and
local communities were promised that if they constructed public goods
such as health clinics and schools the government would cover the
running costs. The CDF thus cemented existing norms regarding the de-
velopmental role of local leaders in the public mindset (Cheeseman
b). It is as a result of this less well-documented, if uneven, strand in
Kenya’s history that Ndegwa’s rankings put Kenya into the ‘high decentral-
isation’ category () even before the reforms of .
However, neither size nor the country’s relatively democratic politics
can explain why a more substantial system of political devolution was
introduced in , when minority communities and some opposition
parties had been campaigning for it for over  years. The prospect
for fundamental political change had looked promising when KANU
was ﬁnally defeated by NaRC in , but the newly elected President,
Mwai Kibaki refused to support a new constitution, despite the fact
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that he had risen to power on the back of a promise to enact a new con-
stitution within  days. As a result, his government disintegrated, and
his former running mate, Raila Odinga, successfully led a ‘no’ campaign
in a constitutional referendum, by mobilising widespread frustration at
the government’s watering down of a more radical and participatory
document popularly known as the Bomas Draft (Lynch ; Mutua
). So why was Kibaki prepared to lead the campaign for a ‘yes’
vote in the referendum of  for a constitution that was at least as
radical as the Bomas Draft that he had sidelined ﬁve years previously?
As Nelson Kasﬁr () has argued, elite support for a reform consti-
tution in  can be explained through an unplanned sequence of
responses that followed the unprecedented violence of the /
post-election crisis. The election campaign had been one of the closest
in Kenyan history, and ended in acrimony when the validity of
Kibaki’s narrow victory over Odinga was called into question by both
the opposition and European election observers. In the unrest that fol-
lowed, over , people lost their lives and almost , were dis-
placed (Lynch ), and there appeared to be a real risk that the
country would descend into a period of extended civil conﬂict
(Cheeseman a; Chege ).
In the wake of the crisis, the general consensus was that, while the vio-
lence was triggered by a disputed election, it was fuelled by deep-rooted
problems including a top-heavy political system and a tendency towards
winner-takes-all politics (Kenya ; Mueller ; Branch &Cheeseman
; Lynch ), an interpretation that revitalised the longstanding
campaign for constitutional reform (Mutua ). In this context, the pol-
itical negotiations that led to an end to the post-election violence and the
formation of a coalition government included discussion of the historical
causes of the violence, and committed the country’s political elite to con-
stitutional reform, which ushered in the  Constitution of Kenya
Review Act.
Among other things, this Act established a small Committee of
Experts to consolidate prior drafts by resolving inconsistencies
between existing draft constitutions. In addition, the public was encour-
aged to submit their views through memoranda or attendance at public
meetings, and a special parliamentary select committee was mandated to
consider the draft and offer modiﬁcations. High levels of public partici-
pation – through the submission of , memoranda and relatively
high turnout rates at the Committee of Expert’s public consultative
meetings – enhanced the legitimacy of the new draft. Signiﬁcantly, the
proposed constitution drew heavily on the ‘Bomas Draft’, which
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contained the strongest provisions for decentralisation of the three pre-
vious draft constitutions under consideration (Kasﬁr ). As a result,
county governors were given real economic and political power
enshrined under the Constitution. This was important because the Act
empowered parliament to offer amendments to, but not reject, the
Committee of Expert’s draft. Given that both sides of the political
divide had publicly committed to reform, by the time that the new
draft reached the legislature, the scope for manoeuvre was also signiﬁ-
cantly constrained.
Nonetheless, the Committee of Expert’s recommendations could still
have been undermined. Indeed, the sabotaging of the  draft consti-
tution occurred after it had been sent to parliament. Three other factors
appear to have made the new arrangements more palatable to those in
power. First, by , Kibaki was in his second and ﬁnal term as presi-
dent, and was beginning to think more about his political legacy.
Although he was clearly determined to hand power to a sympathetic suc-
cessor, he followed the pattern of a number of other outgoing African
presidents who proved to be more willing to implement reform when
their own political fate was no longer on the line (Cheeseman ).
Second, by , President Kibaki was also in a much weaker position
than in . Not only had he been forced to accept a power-sharing
government, but his domestic and international legitimacy had fallen
following the post-election crisis of /. Although the Kenyan gov-
ernment remained bullish in its engagement with foreign powers, and
continued to beneﬁt from its important role as an American ally in
the war-on-terror, Kibaki recognised the need to relegitimise his govern-
ment. Third, MPs introduced changes to the draft constitution so that it
promised to create  countries with boundaries modelled on colonial
districts, rather than devolving power to the existing eight provinces,
as many long-standing proponents of devolution desired (Willis &
Chome : ). The proposed political units were sufﬁciently
small that it seemed unlikely that any individual county would be able
to mount a serious challenge to the central government. As a result,
Kibaki’s advisors may have underestimated how difﬁcult it would be to
re-establish central control once the new system had been established.
The combined effect of the strong historical demand for decentralisa-
tion, the actions of the Committee of Experts, and the government’s
need for political legitimacy, resulted in the adoption of a constitutional
draft that conferred real economic and political power on county gov-
ernments. In turn, the willingness of Kibaki and Odinga to campaign to-
gether in favour of the new constitution, recalling the  election
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campaign when the two men worked side-by-side to remove KANU from
power, was a remarkable moment of national rapprochement and
ensured that the draft passed the referendum with the ‘yes’ camp secur-
ing ·% of the vote.
T H E D E S I G N O F D E V O L U T I O N
The constitution that emerged from the  referendum established a
number of new political positions at the county level, which draw heavily
on the US model of state government. Each county directly elects a
Governor, who is given a free hand to appoint the County Executive
Council, and ismandated to take the lead when it comes to budget and de-
velopment planning. However, the Governor’s legislative agenda must be
approved by the County Assembly, which is comprised of members
(MCAs) who are directly elected at the ward level. Counties also directly
elect senators, who are intended to play a national-level role, representing
their county in the Senate. This newly created second chamber of parlia-
ment is designed to defend county interests and help craft bills affecting
the counties, but also enjoys wider power such as the ability to impeach
the President, Deputy President, Governor and Deputy Governors.
According to the constitution, no less than % of government
revenue –KSh  bn in  –must be devolved to the county level.
It is important to note that this only refers to the funds explicitly trans-
ferred to county governments – the national government continues to
fund county-level services that have remained in its jurisdiction, such
as national security and the police force. In this sense, the total govern-
ment spend at the county level is considerably higher than the % that
must run directly through the county governments. In addition to these
revenues, the constitution mandates the national government to estab-
lish and manage an Equalisation Fund to strengthen the provision of es-
sential services in historically marginalised communities. However, this
Fund only receives ·% of national revenue and has received little at-
tention thus far. Another avenue of ﬁscal transfer has also been over-
looked, namely the ability of the national government to make
conditional grants to counties, which is perhaps more surprising given
the vague constitutional guidelines on how such grants should be
awarded, which has created a system that appears vulnerable to manipu-
lation. Although no conditional grants were allocated in –, the
amount allocated through this mechanism increased from KSh bn to
KSh bn between  and  (Table I).
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Despite the decision to write a minimum threshold for the proportion
of funds to be devolved to the county level into the constitution, the last
three years have witnessed almost continuous debate concerning the
basis on which the proportion of revenues owed to the counties
should be calculated, and how much they require to be self-sufﬁcient.
An early bone of contention was whether counties should pay for the
costs of their staff out of their own budget, or whether this bill should
be picked up by the national government. Subsequent disagreement
has focused on how much more than the minimum threshold of
funds should be devolved given the heavy responsibilities that the coun-
ties have been given in terms of priority areas such as healthcare. These
battles over revenue allocation are covered in detail in the next two sec-
tions, but it is worth noting that discussion of this topic has been compli-
cated by confusion over how the proportion of revenue that the counties
receive should be calculated.
The  constitution stipulates that the % of national revenues
must be devolved based on the last audited accounts that have been
approved by the National Assembly. Due to the sluggish nature of the
auditing and approval process, the last set of relevant accounts dates
back to –. Because the Kenyan economy has grown at
around % a year since then – while the baseline for the constitutional
threshold has remained the same – the national government has been
able to make relatively modest increases in the county allocation while
using the – ﬁgure to claim that the proportion of revenue allo-
cated to the counties increased from % to % between  and
 (Daily Nation  March ). By contrast, county governors,
who are keen to make the case that they require more resources, are
fond of quoting the proportion of revenue they receive based on total
government revenue in that year. By invoking the spirit rather than
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the letter of the constitution – which imagined that the auditing and ap-
proval of accounts would be done on an annual basis – they are able to
argue that the proportion of funds they receive has in fact remained con-
stant (Table I). The confusion caused by two sets of leaders quoting dif-
ferent sets of ﬁgures has been magniﬁed by the media, which typically
fails to specify the basis on which the numbers that it carries were
calculated.
Devolved revenues are distributed between the  counties on the
basis of a formula designed by the Commission on Revenue Allocation
(CRA), a body set up by the constitution for this purpose (Table II).
According to the formula, all counties receive an equal share of %
of national revenues and a further % based on their ﬁscal responsibil-
ities. The remaining revenues are distributed on the basis of population,
poverty and land area. This has led to signiﬁcant variation in the amount
of funds received by different counties, with counties with large popula-
tions, such as Nairobi, and high poverty and large land area, such as
Turkana, receiving a considerably larger slice of the pie. In February
, for example, the County Allocation of Revenue Bill prepared by
the National Treasury allotted KSh · billion to Nairobi, while
Lamu received just KSh  billion.
Counties are also able to raise their own revenue in certain areas pre-
scribed by the constitution. These include taxes on property, entertain-
ment and any other taxes authorised by an Act of Parliament. In
addition, Governors may levy fees and charges in return for directly pro-
vided services such as waste management. As with the distribution of na-
tional revenues, local revenue generation has been the subject of
considerable controversy. Most notably, representatives of the private
sector and the National Treasury have accused the counties of infringing
on forms of taxation that were intended to be reserved for the national
government, resulting in a damaging system of double-taxation that has
signiﬁcantly increased the costs of doing business – especially for those
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ﬁrms that work across county borders (Daily Nation,  January ). To
date, however, most counties have struggled to raise signiﬁcant revenues:
the exceptions are the country’s economic hubs and tourist destinations:
Machakos, Mombasa, Nairobi, Narok and Nakuru (Burbidge b).
The following two sections of the paper examine these early struggles
over the distribution of power and resources, focusing on the new sites of
competition that have emerged between different elected ofﬁcials at the
county level, and the launch of the governor’s campaign for a constitu-
tional referendum to protect and strengthen devolution in . We
suggest that the referendum campaign should not be read solely as a re-
sponse to the efforts of the newly elected Jubilee Alliance government to
recentralise power. Rather, we argue that it must also be understood as a
central element in a strategy through which governors have, collectively,
cast themselves as the embodiment of devolution – the guardians of the
very idea of decentralised power – and thus helped position themselves
against both the centre and their local competitors.
T H E L O C A L A R E N A : C O U N T Y L E V E L C O M P E T I T I O N
In the discussions around the  constitution, governors were ima-
gined as technocrats. They were to be the chief executives of county gov-
ernments, preferably people who had not been previously involved in
politics. Their role replicated the notional separation of legislative and
executive power that runs through the  constitution: along with
their cabinet of executive secretaries – all appointed, like the national
cabinet – they were quite separate from the county assembly with its
electedmembers (MCAs), whose task was to pass legislation and exercise
oversight.
The reality worked out a little differently, in large part because of the
considerable economic and political authority vested in the new posi-
tions. As a result, technocrats often found themselves outmanoeuvred
by politicians and in some cases senior civil servants with strong political
connections. One consequence of this development was that while elec-
tion campaigns featured promises of efﬁciency and service delivery, they
were fought in familiar ways: a mixture of promises of patronage and
promotion of communal interests; the distribution of largesse; the use
of multiple petty intermediaries to channel gifts and win the trust of
local communities; and denigration of opponents (Cornell & D’Arcy
; Willis & Chome ; Chome ). Competition was heated
not just between parties but also within them, as candidates struggled
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to persuade local opinion makers and party ofﬁcials to back ﬁrst their
nomination and second their election. Thus, most governors came to
power indebted, in some cases ﬁnancially to those who had sponsored
them, but in all cases politically, to those who had campaigned for
them and used their inﬂuence (whether small or large) to secure votes.
Overall, the March  elections were dominated by a bitter battle
for the presidency, fought out by two rival coalitions of parties: Uhuru
Kenyatta’s Jubilee Alliance and Raila Odinga’s CORD. The coalitions,
like most of the parties, were newly created and organisationally weak
in themselves, but they drew on networks of local mobilisers, which
were often at least partly ethnic and which were relatively efﬁcient in
turning out voters. However, the organisational weakness of the
parties meant that party loyalty among political leaders was weak, and
that local patterns of alliance and rivalry did not always follow ethnic
lines. In the presidential election, and the national assembly elections,
Jubilee emerged victorious, but CORD won more gubernatorial seats
( as compared with ) and took the strategically and symbolically
signiﬁcant seat of Nairobi.
A second aspect of county-level politics that was not foreseen during
the constitutional negotiations was just how heated the political battles
between county ofﬁcials would become once they had been elected.
Even governors that won their seats convincingly have not enjoyed an
easy ride. Instead, different sets of county-level actors have teamed up
against each other, with senators seeking to eat into the resources ear-
marked for governors, MPs struggling to retain their proﬁle, and
MCAs attempting to enhance their own positions by using their role as
legislative veto players to leverage demands for greater inﬂuence. At
the same time, a number of senators and MPs have announced that
they will vie for governorships in , while many MCAs have set their
sights on entering the National Assembly. In practice, these political
aspirations often involve criticism of, and efforts to undermine and frus-
trate the current governor through, among other things, public criticism
of their efforts and mutually proﬁtable alliances with local (or other)
MCAs.
It is partly in response to these local challenges that governors have
sought to strengthen their own positions as the champions of devolu-
tion. Wary of being accused of failing to represent local interests and
in need of further resources to withstand the challenge from their
rivals, the vast majority of governors have campaigned for greater
funds while resisting government co-optation. In this way, pressures
from within the local arena have led governors to adopt a more
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combative stance within the national arena. As we shall see, many gov-
ernors have responded to the two level game that they now ﬁnd them-
selves playing by occupying a “sweet spot” on the spectrum between
pro-centralisation and pro-decentralisation in which they are sufﬁciently
aggressive in their defence of devolution to be seen as defenders of local
interests, while being sufﬁciently careful in how they push their concerns
not to make unnecessary enemies at the national level.
One of the most signiﬁcant sources of difﬁculty for governors has
been the determination of senators to create a role for themselves in
county affairs, which itself stems from a discrepancy between the status
afforded to senators and the reality of their position under the new pol-
itical dispensation. Many senior political ﬁgures put themselves forward
for the position of senator, perhaps thinking that the role would convey
the kind of authority and inﬂuence that it does in the USA. However,
after taking ofﬁce, many senators came to the rude realisation that in
many ways they were the ‘spare wheel’ of Kenyan decentralisation. An
initial battle with the national assembly, which revolved around which le-
gislation had to be passed to the senate for approval, ended in a tech-
nical victory for the senate – but the national assembly has continued
to sideline the upper chamber (The Star  Nov. ).
The legislative marginalisation of senators was not the only reason that
so many within the second chamber moved into open confrontation
with governors. Kenyan voters have historically valued the legislative
role of their representatives far less than their ability to link them into
sources of patronage and development (Barkan ; Barkan &
Okumu ). This public association between leadership and develop-
ment resources now also characterises county level positions, with
elected representatives facing considerable pressure from below to
protect local interests in terms of both immediate assistance and the pro-
motion and defence of perceived collective interests (Chome ).
Deprived of any prominent role as the champions of devolution, sena-
tors quickly recognised that unless they could position themselves as a
source of patronage they risked becoming irrelevant. MPs had retained
responsibility for their constituencies (including control over the
Constituency Development Fund), and governors had primary responsi-
bility for managing the funds transferred from central to county govern-
ments. Even MCAs, the lowest level of elected representative, had
successfully lobbied to increase their own emoluments and perks
(Standard Digital  Nov. ), which they justiﬁed on the basis of the
need for their own ‘development funds’. Senators were clearly being
left behind in the patronage race.
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Recognising the weakness of their position, a group of senators had
already begun to coordinate across party lines by September .
Their aim was to create a role for themselves in county level develop-
ment activity by arguing for the creation of County Development
Boards to coordinate and review development efforts at the county
level (Standard Digital  Sept. ). Unsurprisingly, when the pro-
posed legislation was introduced to parliament by Nandi Senator
Stephen Sang, it transpired that senators were not only to be repre-
sented on the boards, but were speciﬁed as their chairs. This measure
became the focus for an alliance of convenience between senators and
MPs – otherwise usually bitterly opposed to one another – against gov-
ernors (Daily Nation  Feb. ).
Although the proposed boards do not have direct control over devel-
opment funds themselves, the legislation gave them the power to con-
sider and adopt the County Development Plan and the County
Budget. It is not yet clear whether this means that the boards will actually
have the power to veto development plans and budgets that they deem
not to be in the counties’ interests, but it seems clear that they will be
able to complicate and prolong the process, which may well enable
them to secure some concessions. This is signiﬁcant, because it empow-
ers senators to force home their criticisms of the spending priorities of
many governors. In particular, senators have exploited media coverage
of some of the more questionable budget lines of county governments
to depict their competitors as corrupt and irresponsible. In January
, a report by the OCB found that in the ﬁrst quarter of the
– ﬁnancial year, % of expenditure at the county level
went ‘towards personal emoluments, % for operations and mainten-
ance, and only % towards development programmes’ (Sabahi Online
 Jan. ). At the same time, it was estimated that the counties
spent ‘ billion shillings ($· million) on domestic and foreign
travel, · million shillings ($· million) on conferences, and 
million shillings ($· million) on training’.
Indeed, the frequency and size of county delegations to other African
and European states on ‘fact ﬁnding’ missions quickly became a source
of considerable scandal and amusement, which culminated in eight
countries (including the USA and Rwanda) taking the unusual step of
requesting the Kenyan government to block any further delegations
on the basis that they are ‘not of any value to our bilateral relationship’
(The Star  Aug. ). Echoing comments by the Controller of Budget
(Kenya b), Agnes Odhiambo, many senators publicly argued that
the budget ﬁgures were proof that public funds were being misused.
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Most notably, Senate Majority Leader Kithure Kindiki, criticised the high
level of spending on salaries and trips, and pledged to ‘push for amend-
ments to the Public Finance Management Act that will ensure that the
bulk of the allocations to counties are used for development projects’
(Sabahi Online  Jan. ).
Concerned that senators would be able to use the County Development
Boards to block politically expedient expenditure – and to build a plat-
form to challenge for the governorship in future elections – governors
moved against what many saw as a blatant attempt to infringe on their au-
thority. The high-proﬁle Governor of Bomet, Isaac Rutto claimed that the
Boards were designed to weaken governors and impede development at
the county level. However, governors lacked a legislative presence
through which to contest the legislation, because members of both the
lower house (populated by MPs) and the upper house (populated by
senators) had a vested interest in clipping the wings of increasingly assert-
ive governors who threatened their inﬂuence in their own bailiwicks.
Having failed to defeat the legislation, which was passed by the National
Assembly and signed into law by President Kenyatta on  July 
(Daily Nation  July ), the Governors’ Council of Kenya moved to
challenge it in court. In this way, governors operating in their own self-
interest mobilised to protect county level processes from national level
interference.
This broader tension between senators and governors acting en masse
has been mirrored by tense individual relationships between elected
representatives in many counties. Of course, governor/senator relations
vary considerably across the country. They are typically worse in coun-
tries where the governor and senator represent different parties and dif-
ferent ethnic groups, and have a history of personal rivalry. In Nairobi,
for example, Evans Kidero, a Luo, was elected Governor on the ODM
ticket, while Mike Sonko, a Kikuyu, was elected Senator for TNA. Party
and ethnic splits were reinforced by a clash of personal styles: while
Kidero styles himself more as a progressive technocrat, Sonko is a self-
professed populist.
Despite rumours throughout  that Kidero had fallen out with
Odinga and was being courted by Sonko’s party, the relationship
between the two rivals deteriorated over time. In March , Sonko re-
portedly wrote to County Hall ‘seeking to bring the governor to account
over allegations of corruption and wastage of county resources’ (Nairobi
News Mar. ). In response, Kidero took out a paid advert in a local
newspaper to accuse Sonko of showmanship, arguing that despite his
purported concern over budgetary issues he regularly missed meetings
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scheduled to discuss development plans (The People May ). Not to
be outdone, Sonko moved to demonstrate his ability to get things done
by launching the ‘Sonko Rescue Team’, a set of three emergency ambu-
lances and one ﬁre engine that promised to give free services to Nairobi
residents, who the Senator claims have been left to fend for themselves
by the county’s ‘ineffective’ governor.
In a number of places, these kinds of tensions between the governor
and senator drew MCAs into a set of complex political conﬂicts. At the
same time, many MCAs proved willing and able to manipulate tension
between county level leaders to assert their own interests, even in assem-
blies where the party of the governor had a clear majority. Both of these
trends can be identiﬁed in Embu County, where they have undermined
the effectiveness of the county government. The tenure of Embu
Governor and TNA representativeMartinWambora began inauspiciously,
with a legal challenge to his election. Although the courts upheld his
victory, opposition to the Wambora escalated after he took ofﬁce. The
governor’s critics alleged that he had failed to openly tender a contract
to develop a local stadium and that fertiliser seeds that he had distributed
to farmers had failed because they had been improperly sourced
(Dyzenhaus ).
The senator, speaker and elected MCAs had their own source of griev-
ance, complaining that the governor had delegated too much power to
an unelected administrator – his county secretary, Margaret Kariuki.
Wambora’s loyalty to Kariuki and refusal to listen to his own advisors
led two of the governor’s supposed allies within Kenyatta’s The
National Alliance (TNA), local MP Cecile Mbarire and the Speaker of
the County Assembly, Justus Mate, to initiate impeachment proceedings
to remove him from ofﬁce. Sensing an opportunity to secure greater le-
verage over the Governor,  of Embu’s  MCAs supported the bid,
despite the fact that  of the  elected MCAs and nine of the 
appointed MCAs came from his own party. In response, the Governor
immediately took the assembly to court, arguing that it had impeached
him unfairly (Dyzenhaus ). The Embu High Court agreed with
Wambora’s appeal and issued a court order for the assembly to withdraw
their motion.
However, this was not the end of the matter. The senate proceeded to
ignore the order and passed the motion, voting to impeach Wambora.
The court subsequently declared the ruling to have no force in April
, but this did not stop the assembly from impeaching Wambora a
second time. In turn, the governor took his appeal to the Kilimani
High Court, which issued a decision preventing the deputy governor
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from being sworn in and allowing Wambora to keep his job while a third
case continued in court (Dyzenhaus ). It was not until September
 that the matter was ﬁnally resolved, when the Kilimani High
Court ruled that the Assembly had acted incorrectly and ofﬁcially rein-
stated Wambora (Daily Nation  Sept. ).
Although this gave the outward appearance that Wambora had van-
quished his rivals, changes to the county budget reveal that Embu’s
MCAs were able to use the governor’s political weaknesses to extract
valuable concessions. Instead of Wambora’s favoured approach of focus-
ing on a small number of ﬂagship projects, Embu’s budget for –
 allocated each MCA a total of KES million to spend on projects
within their ward at their own discretion. In the heat of the impeach-
ment proceedings, MCAs had used their enhanced leverage to position
themselves as the fonts of patronage (Dyzenhaus ). Like senators,
MCAs understood that unless they could fashion an important role for
themselves within the development process, their political inﬂuence,
and hopes for re-election and parliamentary aspirations, would be
undermined.
Less intense but otherwise similar processes played out in many other
counties. To date, MCAs have attempted to impeach governors in
Bungoma, Kericho and Makueni, and have threatened impeachment
in numerous others, while the creation of dedicated ward development
funds for MCAs is fast becoming the norm. MCAs have also become con-
scious of their ability to remove the county executives appointed by the
governor – with many executives standing accused of abuse of ofﬁce,
gross misconduct and incompetence. Such allegations may often be
deserved, but it is clear that MCAs sometimes also use this oversight
role over county executives, not to improve governance, but to negotiate
for tenders, contracts, and other favours.
As this potted history of the politics of Embu county suggests, the col-
lective pressure that this kind of behaviour places on governors can be
immense. Governor Wambora spent much of his ﬁrst two years in
ofﬁce not planning new development strategies for the county but
simply seeking to protect his own position. It was precisely this kind of
experience that motivated Wambora, and others like him, to push for
greater ﬁnancial resources and political power in order to be able to
head-off his rivals. For governors in highly contested and competitive
counties, defending and expanding the power of the counties was not
simply a matter of personal preference, but of self-preservation. Thus,
whether the attempts of MCAs to secure greater resources are concep-
tualised as a form of political rivalry or simply as ‘extortion’, the net
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effect has been the same: county governors have been forced to pursue
the further devolution of national resources in order to simply sustain
their positions. In this way, political competition within the local arena
has shaped the stance that governors have adopted within the national
arena.
T H E N A T I O N A L A R E N A : G O V E R N O R S V E R S U S T H E C E N T R E
Pressure from below, combined with a desire to use their own positions
to strengthen their own national proﬁle, has led governors to defend
their positions in multiple ways, including efforts to increase the propor-
tion of funds devolved to the counties, resist the extension of control
through centrally appointed county commissioners, and assert their
own status. In pursuing the latter goal, governors have appropriated fa-
miliar performances of state power: ﬂying the national ﬂag from their
vehicles, insisting on the use of the title ‘Excellency’, travelling in motor-
cades with outriders, using specialised number plates for vehicles, and
insisting on their precedence in the complex order of protocol involved
in addressing public meetings. Such efforts attracted some ridicule in
the media, and adverse public comment on the expenses involved
(Daily Nation  July ). But governors’ concern with these
symbols was not merely a matter of personal status or conceit; it was
an assertion of the status of county government itself, a display of the
profound difference between the former system of county and munici-
pal councils, and the new devolved units. Signiﬁcantly, the economic
and political authority invested in governors under the constitution,
such as their power to appoint ofﬁcials, raise various taxes, and deter-
mine county spending priorities, has allowed them to go some way
towards making their dreams a reality. As a result, the system of devolu-
tion began to take on a life of its own.
Crucially, each county was itself now a ‘government’, not merely a
‘council’, as in the old system. That term is laden with signiﬁcance in
the Kenyan political context, where people never tire of explaining
that serikali – the Swahili for government – is siri kali (‘a ﬁerce secret’, lit-
erally), a half-joking etymology, which effectively captures the sense of
government as powerful, inaccessible and dangerous. To insist, as gov-
ernors did, that they should be called ‘Excellency’ was to assert the
novel claims of county governments to local autonomy and power.
The attempt by the central government to remove or restrict these pri-
vileges – initiated by the Attorney-General, Githu Muigai, almost
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immediately after the elections – was a direct rebuff to these assertions,
and a more or less explicit denial that the county governments were ser-
ikali in their own right (Standard  April ). The dispute over these
privileges became an early focus for solidarity amongst governors across
party lines, and has been the subject of continued tension between gov-
ernors and national government.
Isaac Rutto, who had been elected chair of the Council of Governors
in April , was most vocal in asserting such collective rights of gov-
ernors. In August , he gave a cheerfully disingenuous press inter-
view (Daily Nation  Aug. ) in which he said:
We have not said the government is scheming to kill devolution. What we
have been doing was to draw parallels with what happened in  and
 over majimbo. There are a lot of similarities which we can learn
from … If we draw these similarities you will ﬁnd that what the likes of
Tom Mboya did to federalism is what the likes of [National Assembly
Majority Leader Aden] Duale are doing now.
Others echoed the implicit accusation that at least some senior national
government ﬁgures sought to ‘kill devolution’ (Daily Nation  Jan.
). Symbols and titles aside, one of the main areas in which the
central government moved to reassert its predominance was security
and administration. The  constitution implied that the system of
provincial administration – which had been an institution of centralised
authority in Kenya since independence – would be radically reformed,
or even entirely replaced. For generations of Kenyans who had grown
up with a sense of the absolute centrality of the district commissioner
and chief to the machinery of government, this was a major change
(Branch & Cheeseman ) – inspiring for some, alarming for
others. However, the National Government Coordination Act, passed
in the last weeks of the Kibaki government, smuggled a rather different
possibility into the new dispensation, by repackaging the provincial ad-
ministration as ‘national government coordination ofﬁcers’.
Following this Act, each county has a county commissioner, with
deputy and assistant county commissioners below them and the chiefs
retained at the lowest level: their role is the co-ordination of national
government functions. In this way the provincial administration was
‘restructured’ as required by the new constitution through new appoint-
ments to relabelled ofﬁces. In this way the structure of bureaucratic ad-
ministration was once again deconcentrated, rather than decentralised.
However, in contrast to the reforms of the s, commissioners now
had to reckon with a set of conﬁdent county leaders legitimated
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through the ballot box, and who saw resisting central government co-
optation and control as essential to their own chances of retaining
power.
In line with their aspirations to be ‘governments’, almost all counties
set about creating their own administrative structures, parallel to and ri-
valling the national government coordination ofﬁcers. Governors
appointed administrators at the ward and sub-ward levels, and in many
cases made a point of calling public meetings to which national govern-
ment ofﬁcials would not be invited, or where they would be publicly sub-
ordinated to county ofﬁcials (which, in Kenyan terms, means being
made to address the crowd ﬁrst). Although in some counties, governors
and county commissioners have maintained relatively amicable public
relations, in others such as Kiliﬁ, and more recently Mombasa, there
have been very public arguments, with governors and commissioners ac-
cusing one another of interference and/or incompetence.
In this context, county commissioners’ continued control over secur-
ity, which is constitutionally a national government function, was a par-
ticular grievance for some governors, especially where (as at the coast)
there were long-running tensions between security services and signiﬁ-
cant sections of the population. Governors complained both that the se-
curity forces were not guaranteeing the safety of their people, and that
they were abusing their powers; and they demanded some kind of
control over security. For some months it was clear that the county com-
missioners and their staff were struggling in this new environment. In
many counties, various deputy and assistant commissioner posts went
unﬁlled for long periods; and the commissioners reportedly lost, at
least for a while, the effective control that they had long exercised
over the police.
In May , President Kenyatta issued a policy document entitled
‘Framework for Strengthening the Delivery of National Government
Functions at the County Level’, which expressed concern that some
people had ‘distorted the deﬁnition of devolution to mean the transfer
of the functions of National Government to the County Governments’
(Kenya a: ); it reafﬁrmed the role of county commissioners by ex-
plicitly casting them as the representatives of the president in the county,
and restated their power to coordinate the activities of all central govern-
ment departments. Strikingly, the document mentioned Presidential
Circular No. , issued by Jomo Kenyatta in , which had a similar
content, and it also explicitly expressed concern that reforms in
recent decades had weakened national government:
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the authority of the administrative ofﬁcers in the co-ordination of
Government business has been eroded doe to various reform initiative
[sic] whose effect has progressively removed the administrator from the
centre in terms of co-ordinating Government business.
These statements seemed to be a direct criticism both of the  con-
stitution and of other reforms that preceded it. While the Framework
insisted that county commissioners should not ‘undermine the authority
of the governor’, this was an implicit rebuff to governors’ demands for a
greater security role; it was also a reminder to all of the primacy of the
administration in security matters.
Alongside these tensions over administration and security, governors
and national government have been in a prolonged struggle over
resources. These conﬂicts have revolved both around the ownership
of government assets in the counties (particularly buildings and lands)
and, more intractably, around budgets. As already noted, although a
small number of counties have signiﬁcant potential for raising revenue
through local property taxes, or through charges on tourism, the consti-
tution does not give counties the ability to levy income or corporation
taxes, or to impose charges for the use of ‘national infrastructure’
(such as major ports) or for mineral extraction. The result is that, al-
though some governors can levy new charges to fund new initiatives,
county governments rely heavily on transfers of funds from the Treasury.
That process is itself conditional on approval of the budget, and on
satisfactory accounting for monies already disbursed, both of which
are managed at the national level by the Ofﬁce of the Controller of
the Budget (OCB). Due to the different perspectives of county and na-
tional leaders regarding the proportion of funds that should be
devolved, there have been repeated stand-offs between governors on
the one hand, and Treasury and OCB on the other (Daily Nation 
Jan. ). In both  and , a number of counties presented
budgets that were not approved, either because they involved signiﬁcant
deﬁcits or because the OCB did not ﬁnd the revenue forecasts plausible.
By October , the national government was openly threatening to
take over county government functions because of alleged failures of
ﬁnancial management.
While the attempt to defend their symbolic privileges brought govern-
ors together, it is this issue of ﬁnance that has come to be the focus of the
tension that pitted the governors, as a group, against the national gov-
ernment. Across party lines, and across the country, all governors
seemed able to agree that the counties should receive more money
from the national government; and when Rutto ﬁrst proposed a
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referendum to amend the constitution in July , he had already
decided on this as the focus (Daily Nation  July ). For some
months, the governors’ referendum remained in part a negotiating
tactic – an effective means to leverage additional funds and to rally gov-
ernors and present them as the collective guardians of devolution,
united in struggle with the national government.
The viability of this strategy was threatened when, in July ,
Odinga announced a new CORD push for a referendum dubbed Okoa
Kenya (‘Save Kenya’), which initially included a much broader set of
demands for constitutional revisions that included larger county govern-
ment budgets, but also the need to dissolve the Independent Electoral
and Boundaries Commission. As Okoa Kenya came to focus more squarely
on devolution, governors found themselves in danger of being either
subsumed into, or outﬂanked by, this new initiative. The subsequent
impact of Odinga’s intervention brings into sharp relief the way in
which party politics shapes the strategies. Those who were ﬁrmly
within the CORD camp found it relatively easy to offer their support
to the initiative because their communities were typically sympathetic
to Odinga, and the national government had fewer levers through which
to apply pressure. By contrast, ﬁgures within the Jubilee Alliance – includ-
ing Rutto, who is a member of Deputy President William Ruto’s United
Republican Party, and thus part of the government –were naturally
more wary of being seen to back a campaign led by the opposition,
despite the obvious beneﬁts they would have received had they been suc-
cessful. Indeed, due to the high level of ethnic polarisation, it would have
been almost impossible for governors elected in Jubilee strongholds to join
hands with CORD (Lynch in Saturday Nation  Sept. ). Thus, despite
Odinga’s repeated invitations for governors to join the CORD campaign,
Rutto’s group continued to shun partisan politics.
Instead, governors began to pursue their own campaignmore actively,
by collecting the signatures required as part of the referendum process
(The Star  Sept. ). The decision to badge their referendum cam-
paign Pesa mashinani, ‘money to the grass-roots’, was a simple assertion
of the governors’ desire to focus political debate on ﬁnance, and to
present the key issue as the battle between national government and
devolved governments.
The mobilisation of governors in line with a set of issues supported by
the opposition represented a clear threat to the ability of the govern-
ment to control the political agenda, despite the non-partisan stance
of many county leaders. In response, the Jubilee Alliance sought to frac-
ture the movement by turning the referendum issue into one of party
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loyalty: support for a referendum of any kind was presented as pro-
CORD, and resistance as pro-Jubilee. In this way, the government effect-
ively rendered it increasingly difﬁcult for Jubilee governors to support
the Pesa Mashinani campaign lest they be labelled as ‘traitors’ to the
Alliance, and thus to their communities. This was signiﬁcant given the
negative implications such a reputation was perceived to have for their
chances of re-election, especially in Jubilee-aligned ethnic strongholds.
That almost all Jubilee-afﬁliated governors abandoned the referendum
campaign at this point demonstrates the impact of party identities on
governors’ political positioning, and the continued capacity of the gov-
ernment to weaken challenges to its authority by playing divide-and-
rule politics.
However, this should not be taken as evidence that the government
can limit the inﬂuence of the governors at will. For one thing, the national
government only succeeded in preventing more power and resources
from being decentralised, not in recentralising authority under the presi-
dent. Moreover, some of the strategies through which the Jubilee Alliance
undermined support for the referendum campaign actually strengthened
the position of governors within the wider political system. Most notably,
the government proved willing to compromise over the issue of funding,
pledging to further increase the proportion of government revenue that is
devolved to the counties. This enabled Deputy President William Ruto to
argue that there was ‘no need’ for a referendum because some of the core
demands of the counties could be met without one (Daily Nation  Oct.
). This arrangement suited the governors well: the referendum
had only ever been a strategy to gain leverage in the battle for greater pres-
tige and resources. Thus, although from the outside this episode appears
to end with a victory for the central government, in reality the willingness
of the government to make concessions has emboldened governors and
strengthened their hand. In this way, the capacity and willingness of gov-
ernors to work together to advance their collective interests has served to
further entrench the system of devolution itself.
C O N C L U S I O N S : P O P U L A R O P I N I O N A N D T H E F U T U R E O F
D E V O L U T I O N
The Kenyan experience with decentralisation is important because it
demonstrates the signiﬁcance of local political competition for the way
in which local elites engage with the central state. The new political dis-
pensation, and the emergence of a highly competitive local arena that
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features MPs, senators, governors and MCAs, has required governors to
play two political games at different levels of the political system at the
same time. In particular, the pressure that governors have been
placed under at the local level to defend county interests has made it pol-
itically dangerous for them to be co-opted by the centre. The strength of
this pressure varies depending on party loyalties and ethnic afﬁliations,
but it can be seen across the political spectrum. The robust defence of
decentralisation over the last months should therefore be understood
as the product of the combination of the demands placed on governors
at the local level, and the considerable economic and political authority
vested in them by the constitution and associated legislation. Thus far,
the majority of governors have positioned themselves around the
‘sweet spot’ in which they aggressively defend county interests without
moving into all-out confrontation with the national government.
One implication of this conclusion is the need to differentiate the
local political scene. ‘Local notables’ are not a cohesive group in any
of Kenya’s counties. Rather, they are typically divided along lines of per-
sonal rivalry (sometimes exacerbated by ethnic tensions) and they are in
ﬁerce competition for the resources offered by government positions.
Salaries, allowances, bursary funds, control over licences and property,
the issuing of contracts, and the hiring of staff, all come with elected
ofﬁce, and county governments have become a ﬁeld for vigorous contests
over these beneﬁts. As Cornell & D’Arcy have argued (Forthcoming), gov-
ernors, senators, MCAs and MPs all vie for such resources, and all have an
eye on the next elections and the further prospects for reward that elected
ofﬁce (and larger ofﬁces) will bring. Such efforts to undermine and
weaken political competitors have generated an extremely dynamic polit-
ical environment, but they are also problematic, as they encourage un-
necessary duplication and obstacles, rather than effective planning and
collaboration, and provide incentives to acquire wealth through corrupt
means. They also, of course, have the potential to encourage a local politics
of violence and intimidation.
Indeed, in some cases the kind of county-level struggles described
above have been exacerbated by, and have fed into, communal narra-
tives and histories of inter-ethnic conﬂict. In Mandera County, for
example, violence in  was in part linked to contests between the ma-
jority Garre andminority Degodia communities, as the latter argued that
the Garre were seeking to generate a political monopoly in the county,
while Garre presented the Degodia as ‘encroachers’ hoping to expand
into their homeland (The Star  Aug. ). Similarly, in Marsabit
the rivalry between the governor and one of the local MPs followed
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the lines of long-standing tensions between Gabbra and Boran, leading
to an outbreak of violence and threats by the Deputy President to dis-
solve the county government (Daily Nation,  Jan. ,  Jan. ).
In Lamu County, tensions between relatively recent settlers from else-
where in Kenya –mostly Kikuyu – and those who see themselves as indi-
genes were managed in the election campaign, when the successful
candidate for the governor post had a Kikuyu deputy. However, they
exploded in , following a terrorist attack on the mainly Kikuyu
settlement of Mpeketoni that exposed multiple tensions between
elected county ofﬁcials from different ethnic groups (The Star,  July
; Anderson & McKnight ). Thus, while decentralisation has
enhanced competition between the national and county governments,
and thus provided a new check against centralised power, it has also
increased competition over resources and positions at the local level
in ways that have intensiﬁed county-level tensions and may undermine
national cohesion in the future (Burbidge a).
Although there is a very public debate on some of these more prob-
lematic aspects, devolution appears to remain generally popular
among Kenyans. This is important for two reasons. First, it renders the
national government less likely to risk undermining the new arrange-
ments. Second, although decentralisation has exacerbated local tensions
in some parts of the country, the fact that it allows long-marginalised
communities to elect their own leaders has also boosted the legitimacy
of the wider political system. Writing just after the  elections, we
argued that the fact that so many Kenyans who ‘lost’ nationally ‘won’
locally, such as the Odinga supporters in Nairobi, Nyanza and at the
Coast, helped to ensure that the process remained peaceful despite a
divisive campaign and disputed result (Cheeseman et al. ).
A nationally representative survey conducted in conjunction with Ipsos
Synovate in August  supports this interpretation.While an average
of %of Kenyans continued to support the principle of devolution, this
ﬁgure was lower in pro-government areas, such as the former Central
Province, and higher in those places that supported CORD in the 
election and have historically felt marginalised from power, such as the
former Nyanza (%) andWestern (%) provinces. The capacity of de-
volution to restrain some of the centrifugal forces at play in Kenyan pol-
itics is conﬁrmed by the reasons that respondents gave for supporting
devolution. A clear majority (%) explained that they support decen-
tralisation because they believe that it brings more resources to the grass-
roots and ensures their more equitable distribution.
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In-line with our analysis of the impact of party politics on attitudes to
devolution, and hence the strength of public pressure applied to govern-
ors, pro-CORD areas are also more likely to support the referendum
campaigns discussed in this paper. While % of Kikuyu respondents
rejected the idea, following the lead of their co-ethnic Uhuru
Kenyatta, % of Luo respondents backed the proposal. The three
main reasons that respondents gave for why they backed the campaigns
are telling: to secure more funds for the counties (%), to prevent
the Jubilee Alliance from reneging on past promises (%), and to
stop the government sabotaging devolution (%). Signiﬁcantly, the
central role played by governors in taking the national government to
task, and their conscious attempts to present themselves as the embodi-
ment of decentralisation appear to be working, at least as far as public
opinion is concerned. On average, % of respondents declared conﬁ-
dence in governors, as compared with senators at %, MCAs at %
and county commissioners at %.
The combination of vigilant governors, constitutional protections and
public popularity suggests that devolution in Kenya is here to stay. This is
not to suggest that the recentralisation of power is unthinkable. The
central government remains by far the strongest actor in the Kenyan pol-
itical scene, and continues to control counties’ purse strings. Moreover,
the ability of the Jubilee Alliance to undermine the momentum of the
governors’ referendum by playing divide-and-rule party politics demon-
strates that the centre well understands how to manipulate the periph-
ery. But these caveats notwithstanding, what is striking about the
Kenyan political system is not the ability of the national government to
interfere in the decentralisation process, which is well covered in the lit-
erature on Africa, but the capacity of county-level governments to ﬁght
back, which is not.
N O T E S
. Cheeseman and Willis have both visited Kenya every few months over the last three years as
part of various research projects, including research in Nairobi, Mombasa and the former Western
Province, while Lynch has been based in Nairobi since  and has carried out research in
Nairobi, Turkana and throughout the former Rift Valley Province.
. The case studies were conducted by the research assistants thanked in the acknowledgements
to a template created by the authors.
. Harambee proved to be extremely successful, but the formal system broke down when the public
supply of clinics and schools began to outstrip the government’s capacity to provide teachers and
nurses in the mid s, and the government was forced to try regulate the number of harambee
activities.
. This table originally appeared in Burbidge (a), and this discussion here draws on conver-
sations with Burbidge in addition to the analysis provided in his original paper.
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. For more information on the CRA, see: http://www.crakenya.org/.
. For a full description of the formula, see CRA, ‘Revenue Allocation Formula’, n.d., http://
www.crakenya.org/information/revenue-allocation-formula/.
. Nine governors were also elected on the tickets of minor parties, often as a result of disputed
party nominations.
. The case was ongoing at the time of writing.
. The number of elected MCAs is topped up by a number of nominated MCAs who are selected
by party leaders in proportion to their elected seats; a measure intended to represent minority groups
and women.
. A statutory body established as part of the decentralisation reforms.
. The poll was conducted by Ipsos Synovate on the basis of questions designed by the authors. A
nationally representative sample of , people were interviewed about a range of political and eco-
nomic beliefs and attitudes, including devolution. The margin of error on the poll was ± ·% with a
% conﬁdence interval.
R E F E R E N C E S
Akech, M. . Institutional Reform in the New Constitution of Kenya. Nairobi: International Centre for
Transitional Justice.
Anderson, D.M. . ‘‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism and the Party Politics of
Decolonization in Kenya, –’, Journal of Contemporary History , : –.
Anderson, D.M. & J. McKnight. . ‘Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa’,
African Affairs , : –.
Barkan, J.D. . ‘Comment: further reassessment of “conventional wisdom”: political knowledge
and voting behavior in rural Kenya’, American Political Science Review , : –.
Barkan, J.D. & J.J. Okumu. . ‘Linkage without parties: Legislators and constituents in Kenya’, in
K. Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkage: a comparative perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, –.
Barkan, J. & M. Chege. . ‘Decentralising the state: district focus and the politics of reallocation in
Kenya’, Journal of Modern African Studies , : –.
Bodea, C. & A. LeBas. . ‘The origins of voluntary compliance: attitudes toward taxation in
urban Nigeria’, British Journal of Political Science. FirstView. http://dx.doi.org/./
SX.
Boone, C. . ‘Decentralization as political strategy in West Africa’, Comparative Political Studies :
–.
Boone, C. . ‘Land conﬂict and distributive politics in Kenya’, African Studies Review , : –.
Brancati, D. . ‘Decentralization: fueling the ﬁre or dampening the ﬂames of ethnic conﬂict and
secessionism?’, International Organization , : –.
Branch, D. & N. Cheeseman. . ‘The politics of control in Kenya: understanding the bureaucrat-
ic-executive state, –’, Review of African Political Economy , : –.
Branch, D. & N. Cheeseman. . ‘Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: lessons
from Kenya’, African Affairs , : –.
Burbidge, D. a. ‘Democracy vs. diversity: ethnic representation in a devolved Kenya’, Working
Paper. http://princeton.academia.edu/DominicBurbidge.
Burbidge, D. b. ‘County ﬁnancing at the macro and micro level’, Seminar Paper presented at
the Public Participation and Local Revenue Generation Workshop, World Bank, Nairobi.
Cheeseman, N. a. ‘The Kenyan elections of : an introduction’, Journal of Eastern African
Studies , : –.
Cheeseman, N. b. ‘Kenya since : the more things change the more they stay the same’, in L.
Whitﬁeld & R. Mustapha, eds. Africa Since . London: James Currey, –.
Cheeseman, N. . ‘African elections as vehicles for change’, Journal of Democracy , : –.
Cheeseman, N. . ‘The internal dynamics of power-sharing in Africa’, Democratization , :
–.
Cheeseman, N., G. Lynch & J. Willis. . ‘Democracy and its discontents: understanding Kenya’s
 elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies , : –.
Chege, M. . ‘Kenya: back from the brink?’, Journal of Democracy , : –.
 N I C C H E E S E M A N E T A L
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1500097X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 25 May 2018 at 14:17:08, subject to the Cambridge Core
Chome, N. . ‘“Devolution is only for development”? Decentralization and elite vulnerability on
the Kenyan coast’, Critical African Studies , : –.
Conyers, D. . ‘Decentralisation and service delivery: lessons from sub-Saharan Africa’, IDS
Bulletin , : –.
Cornell, A. &M. D’Arcy. . ‘Plus ca change? County-level politics in Kenya after devolution’, Journal
of Eastern African Studies , : –.
Cornell, A. &M. D’Arcy. Forthcoming. ‘Everyone’s turn to eat? Devolution and corruption in Kenya’,
African Affairs.
Crawford, G. & C. Hartmann. (eds). . Decentralisation in Africa: a pathway out of poverty and conﬂict?
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Dyzenhaus, A. . ‘Land, local government and minority representation: the experience of decen-
tralisation in Kenya’, Unpublished MPhil dissertation, University of Oxford.
Kasﬁr, N. . ‘Agency across changing sites: the path to Kenya’s  constitution’, in T. Förster &
L. Koechlin, The Politics of Governance. Abingdon: Routledge, –.
Kenya, Republic of. . Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence. Nairobi: Government Printer.
Kenya, Republic of. a. ‘Public Service Commission: Framework for Strengthening the Delivery of
National Government Functions at the County Level’. Nairobi: Government Printer.
Kenya, Republic of. b. Ofﬁce of the Controller of the Budget, County Governments: Annual Budget
Implementation Review Report, FY /. Nairobi: Government Printer.
Lynch, G. . ‘The fruits of perception: ‘ethnic politics’ and the case of Kenya’s constitutional ref-
erendum’, African Studies , : –.
Lynch, G. . ‘Durable solution, help or hindrance? the failings and unintended implications of
relief and recovery efforts for Kenya’s post-election IDPs’, Review of African Political Economy :
–.
Lynch, G. . I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Mueller, S. . ‘The political economy of Kenya’s crisis’, Journal of Eastern African Studies , : –
.
Mutua, M. . Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: taming Leviathan. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
Ndegwa, S.N. . Decentralization in Africa: a stocktaking survey. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Putnam, R. . ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’, International
Organization , : –.
Robinson, M. . ‘Introduction: decentralising service delivery? Evidence and policy implications’,
IDS Bulletin , : –.
Rondinelli, D.A., J.S. McCullough & R.W. Johnson. . ‘Analysing decentralization policies in
developing countries: a political‐economy framework’, Development and Change , : –.
Suberu, R. . Federalism and Ethnic Conﬂict in Nigeria. Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace.
Tocqueville, A.D.  []. Democracy in America, edited by J. P. Mayer, translated by G. Lawrence.
New York, NY: Anchor-Doubleday.
USAID. . Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook. Washington, DC: USAID.
Willis, J. & N. Chome. . ‘Marginalization and political participation on the Kenya coast: the 
elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies , : –.
World Bank. . ‘Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa’ [Berg Report]. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
World Bank. . ‘Navigating the storm, delivering the promise with a special focus on Kenya’s mo-
mentous devolution’, Kenya Economic Update .
Wunsch, J.S. . ‘Decentralization, local governance and ‘recentralization’ in Africa’, Public
Administration and Development , : –.
Zanker, F., C. Simons & A. Mehler. . ‘Power, peace and space in Africa: revisiting territorial
power sharing’, African Affairs , : –.
N E W S M E D I A
Daily Nation (online), Letters: ‘Tame county governors before they get too drunk with power’,  July
, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Letters/Tame-county-governors/-///-/
omfsv/-/index.html.
D E C E N T R A L I S A T I O N I N K E N Y A
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1500097X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 25 May 2018 at 14:17:08, subject to the Cambridge Core
Daily Nation (online), ‘Governors vow to push for vote in dispute with Jubilee’,  July , http://
www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Governors-vow-to-push-for-vote-in-dispute-with-Jubilee/-//
/-/hojvt/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Rutto speaks on referendum push’, Daily Nation,  Aug. , http://www.
nation.co.ke/news/politics/Rutto-speaks-on-referendum-push/-///-/aajz/-/
index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘County governments report “shallow and dishonest”: governors’,  Jan. ,
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/counties/-///-/format/xhtml/-/sgjz/-/index.
html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Seek solution to Marsabit conﬂict, MPs tell Raila’,  Jan. , http://mobile.
nation.co.ke/news/Seek-solution-to-Marsabit-conﬂict/-///-/format/xhtml/-/
igf/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Nyachae warns of “insider plot” to destroy devolution’,  Jan. , http://
mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Nyachae-warns-of-insider-plot-to-destroy-devolution-/-//
/-/format/xhtml/-/thrptz/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Politics a key factor in the perennial Marsabit conﬂict’,  Jan. , http://
mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Politics-a-key-factor-in-the-perennial--Marsabit-conﬂict/-//
/-/format/xhtml/-/vrotkz/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘County cheifs must think outside the box’,  Jan. , http://www.nation.
co.ke/oped/Opinion/Counties-Devolution-Taxes-Protests/-///-/view/
printVersion/-/oxtpz/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘MPs, senators hatch plot to tame judges and governors in battle for suprem-
acy’,  Feb. , http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/MPs-Senators-Governors-Devolution-
Counties/-///-/format/xhtml/-/iyvtgz/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Governors ask for more funds’,  Mar. , http://mobile.nation.co.ke/
counties/Governors-National-Assembly-Funds-Treasury/-///-/format/
xhtml/-/elna/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Law puts senators in charge of county cash’,  July , http://mobile.
nation.co.ke/news/Law-puts-senators-in-charge-of-county-cash/-///-/format/
xhtml/-/ajjz/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘Embu speaker to face contempt charges over Wambora’s impeachment’, 
Sept. , http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Embu-Speaker-to-face-contempt-charges-over-
Wambora-impeachment/-///-/format/xhtml/-/iuvpl/-/index.html.
Daily Nation (online), ‘No need for referendum, Ruto says’,  Oct. , http://www.nation.co.ke/
news/No-need-for-referendum-william-Ruto-says/-///-/view/printVersion/-/
fxwkz/-/index.html.
Lynch, G. ‘Devolution has made politics more local and violent than ever before’, Saturday Nation, 
Sept. .
Nairobi News (online), ‘Sonko writes to County Hall over Kidero’s conduct’,  Mar. , http://
nairobinews.co.ke/househelp-/, viewed  Jan. .
Sabahi Online (Washington DC),  Jan. , ‘Criticism builds over spending practices in Kenyan
counties’, by Rajab Ramah, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/
///feature-?format=mobile.
Standard Digital, ‘Keynan ﬁghts to allow governors to ﬂy national ﬂag’,  April , http://www.stan-
dardmedia.co.ke/article//keynan-ﬁghts-to-allow-governors-to-ﬂy-national-ﬂag.
Standard Digital, ‘Governors take on senators over County Governments Bill, ’,  Sept. ,
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article//governors-take-on-senators-over-county-
governments-bill-.
Standard Digital, ‘MCAs win big allowances in salary deal’,  Nov.  http://www.standardmedia.
co.ke/thecounties/article//mcas-win-big-allowances-in-salary-deal.
The People (online), ‘Governors under siege as impeachment fever rises’,  May , http://www.
ipsos.co.ke/NEWBASE_EXPORTS/Tullow%Kenya%BV/_The%People%
Sunday_,_fe.pdf.
The Star (online), ‘Senate big winner in row with MPs’, Nov. , http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/
article-/senate-big-winner-row-mps.
The Star (online), ‘Lamu leaders differ over violence’,  July , http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/
article-/lamu-leaders-differ-over-violence.
The Star, ‘Rhamu seat sparks violence in Mandera’,  Aug. , p. .
 N I C C H E E S E M A N E T A L
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1500097X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 25 May 2018 at 14:17:08, subject to the Cambridge Core
The Star (online), ‘Governors launch signature collection’,  Sept. , http://www.the-star.co.ke/
news/article-/governors-launch-signature-collection.
The Star (online), ‘ countries ban Kenyan MCAs from visiting’, by Gideon Keter,  Aug. ,
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-/-countries-ban-kenyan-mcas-visiting.
D E C E N T R A L I S A T I O N I N K E N Y A
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1500097X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 25 May 2018 at 14:17:08, subject to the Cambridge Core
